NYLS Journal of International and
Comparative Law
Volume 8
Number 1 VOLUME 8 NUMBER 1 WINTER 1986

Article 3

1986

ENFORCEMENT OF GAMING DEBTS IN BRITAIN
Neil Fagan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Fagan, Neil (1986) "ENFORCEMENT OF GAMING DEBTS IN BRITAIN," NYLS Journal of International and
Comparative Law: Vol. 8 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol8/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of
DigitalCommons@NYLS.

ENFORCEMENT OF GAMING DEBTS IN BRITAIN
NEIL FAGAN*

History of Gaming Legislation
Gaming has popular appeal to all sections of British society, and
thus it would be difficult to undertake a full study of gaming legislation
without some examination of its historical background. However, it is
important for those whose law is codified to distinguish common law
systems, where only part of the law is codified in statute and part is
judicially created.
Gaming, though not unlawful at common law,' has been regulated
by statute for more than 400 years. Games in general have been regulated for an even longer period, commencing with a proclamation by
Richard II in 1388 prohibiting the exercise of certain games such as
tennis, football and the "casting of stonekaileg."' Other enactments in
a similar vein followed.3 The purpose of this early legislation was practical in that it sought to prevent games or gaming activity that would
compete with the practice of archery, which was necessary for the defense of the realm.
The Unlawful Games Act of 15414 sought to ban games which apparently involved the use of money. However, that statute, did include
a provision allowing various games to be played by certain noblemen5
and it was lawful for every "master" to license his servants to play
certain games with him or guests in his house.
It was not until 1665 that legislation was introduced having regard
to public morals. 7 In the context of gaming, this legislation was against
* Solicitor, Durrant Piesse (Partner); Chairman, International Bar Association Section on Gaming and Lottery Law.
1. Except for cock fighting. See Regina v. Howel, [1676] 3 Keb. 465, 84 Eng. Rep. 826
(K.B.).
2. 12 Rich. 2, ch. 6 (1388).
3. See 11 Hen. 4, ch. 4 (1409), 17 Edw. 4, ch. 3 (1477), 11 Hen. 7, ch. 2 (1494), 19
Hen. 7, ch. 12 (1503), 3 Hen. 8, ch. 3 (1511), 6 Hen. 8, ch. (1514), 27 Hen. 8, ch. 25 (1535),
33 Hen. 8, ch. 9 (1541).
4. 33 Hen. 8, ch. 9 (1541).
5. Id. at § XXII (provided they owned land with a value of a least £100).
6. Id. at § XXIII.
7. In 1649, the Puritans, under Oliver Cromwell, gained control of England. Although
not adverse to gaming, they felt that gaming was too time-consuming. They passed a
statute in 1657 which provided that a gaming debtor could sue the creditor for the loss
and recover twice that amount. Act of June 26, 1657, 2 AcTs & ORDERS INTERREGNUM
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those games which involved hazarding money. The moralistic approach
typified by this and subsequent legislation as well as various other attempts at regulation were, until the ninteenth century, largely
ineffectual.
The Gaming Act of 17108 attempted to deal with the question of
security, a common theme running through gaming legislation. Section
1 of that Act provided that any security taken, given for money or any
other "valuable thing" won by gaming, or any security for the repayment of money lent for gaming, was void.9 Furthermore, the Gaming
Act of 183510 provided that the consideration (i.e. the money or other
"valuable thing") which arose out of the gaming was deemed to have
been given for an illegal consideration." Thus an action could not be
brought in the courts to enforce the security because it arose out of an
illegal contract.
Under the Gaming Act of 1845," all contracts or agreements by
way of gaming or wagering were deemed null and void.'$ Thus, actions
could not be brought to recover any sum or valuable thing from any
wager. The Gaming Act of 1892' stated that a promise to repay any
sum of money paid under a contract rendered null and void by the
Gaming Act of 1845 was null and void, and no action could be brought
5
to recover such a sum of money or valuable thing.' It is important to
note these historical developments for two reasons; first because it
demonstrates the consistently hostile social attitute toward gaming as
expressed by Parliament, and second, because it indicates that the legislators have faced the reality that gaming has always existed and will
continue to do so.
Gaming in the United Kingdom is now regulated by the Gaming
1249 (reprint 1972). This statute, like all Puritan legislation was abolished upon Charles
II accession to the throne in the Restoration. See 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 148 (2d ed. 1927).
8. 5 & 6 Will. 4, ch. 41 (1710).
9. Id. at § 1.
10. 9 Anne, ch. 19 (1835).
11. Section 1 of the Gaming Act of 1710 voided securities given for such loans without expressly voiding the consideration for them; that is the loan. 5 & 6 Will. 4, ch. 41 §
-I. Section 1 of the Gaming Act of 1835 states that all such securities are deemed to have
been given for an illegal consideration. 9 Anne, ch. 19 § I. It has been held that the
combined effect of those sections voids not only the security, but the loan as well. See
Carlton Hall Club v. Laurence [1929] 2 K.B. 153, 3 All E.R. Rep. 605, (D.C.); but see
C.H.T. v. Ward [1965] 2 Q.B. 63, [19631 3 All E.R. 835, (C.A. 1963), where the Court of
Appeal doubted the validity of that decision.
12. 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 109 (1845).
13. Id. at § 18.
14. 55 & 56 Vict., ch. 9 (1892).
15. Id. at § 1.

19861

GAMING DEBTS IN BRITAIN

Act of 1968,6 which came into force in stages between 1969 and 1971
and represents the cumulation of a series of reforming acts passed during the twentieth century. This act made it unlawful to play any game
which either involved playing or staking against a bank where the
premises are not actually licensed or registered for the purpose of gaming. 1 7 This holds true regardless of who holds the bank, and where the
chances in the game are not equally favorable to all players.' 8 There
are exemptions from this act for gaming which takes place on domestic
occasions or in private dwellings, and gaming in hotels, residence halls,
or similar establishments where gaming is not carried on by way of
trade or business.' 9 Though the private party where a game of roulette
as an after dinner adjunct to the entertainment is acceptable and lawful, the public cannot be invited; the public essentially being those persons not invited.
Attempts to Reform Gaming Legislation
Under the Gaming Act of 1541,20 certain games were barred, and
the common gaming house was prohibited.2 These provisions were the
basis for all future gaming legislation until the sweeping reforms of the
Betting and Gaming Act of 1960.22 The Betting and Gaming Act of
1960 was principally concerned with denying a right of action on gaming contracts and restricting the recoverability of securities in the
hands of third parties given during the course of gaming transactions.
The security provisions of earlier acts survived the 1960 reforms, and
are now specified in and affected by Section 16(4) of the 1968 Act.2 3
Significantly, this section refers to checks as securities,2 4 and the fact
that the 1968 Act deals with enforceability of securities and actions on
such checks indicates that at least the legislators have been consistent
in their belief that regulating gaming debts is only practicable through
regulation of the right to realize security for gaming debts.
The Act of 1960 was based on the recommendations of the Royal
Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming, which sat from 1949 to
1951. The aim of the legislation was summed up as follows:
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

The Gaming Act, 1968, 16 & 17 Eliz. 2, ch. 65 [hereinafter the Act].
Id. at §2(1).
Id.
Id. at §2 (2).
33 Hen. 8, ch. 9 (1541).
Id. at §11.
8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 60 (1960).
16 & 17 Eliz. 2, ch. 65, §16(4).

Id.
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We are led by all the evidence we have heard to the conclusion
that gambling is a factor in the economic life of the country, or
as a cause of crime, is of little significance, and that its effects
on social behaviour, insofar as these are a suitable object for
legislation are in the great majority of cases less important
than has been suggested to us by some witnesses. We therefore
consider that the object of gambling legislation should be to
interfere as little as possible with the individual liberty to take
part in the various forms of gambling, but to impose such restrictions as are desirable and practicable or prevent excess.25
The Act of 1960 was not concerned with any particular game, but
rather with the type of gaming, and the conditions under which it took
place. The Commission recommended that it should be illegal to provide facilities for any type of gaming in which:
1. By reason of the nature of the game the chances of all the
players are not equal;
2. A toll is levied on the stakes or winning by the promoter as
the game is played;
3. Charges are made which vary in accordance with the stakes
for which the game is played.26
The object of these prohibitions was to prevent the exploitation of
gaming by commercial interests and to provide standards by which
gaming was to be considered "lawful gaming." Not surprisingly, the
"conditions of lawful gaming" mirrored those prohibitions and were:
1. The chances must be equally favorable to all players;
2. No toll on stakes or winnings to be taken by the promoter;
3. No charges for taking part in gaming.2"
The Failure of the 1960 Act
The Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act of 1963 s was a consolidating act, with Sections 32 through 47 referring to gaming. Under the
Acts of 1960 and 1963, the conditions for lawful gaming were framed in
clear language and may have succeeded in preventing the exploitation
of gaming by commercial interests had there been no qualifications to
the concept of "lawful gaming." Unfortunately, the legislature made
25.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON BETTING, LOTTERIES AND GAMING, 1949-1951, FINAL REPORT,

Cmd. 8190 para. 409 (1951).
26. Id.
27. Betting and Gaming Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 60, §16 ; Gaming Act, 1968, 16 &
17 Eliz. 2, ch. 65, §§ 13-15.
28. Betting Gaming and Lotteries Act, 1963, 11 & 12 Eliz. 2, ch. 2.
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two qualifications to the general principles in the hopes of making the
law more flexible. These qualifications, however, opened the floodgates
to a large number of small quasi-illegal casinos and unsatisfactory
practices.
The first qualification referred to the "conduct of the gaming" and
required that the game be played in a manner which gave the players
an equal chance.2 This held true even where the banker had a "builtin advantage." It was a simple enough matter to decide whether or not
the chances were equal, but it was left to the courts to decide whether
the advantage built into the game in favor of the banker could be balanced out by the "conduct of the gaming." Generally this was done by
offering the bank to other players and would vary in each particular
case. In many cases where the "conduct of the gaming" was held to be
unlawful, promoters would simply devise alternative means to take its
place. For example in Kursaal Casino Ltd. v. Crickitt,30 although the
bank was offered to the other players, a "means test" had to be met
before the player could accept."' That was held to be unlawful, and as
a result, the promoter altered the rules so that the player could set the
ceiling on his liability as banker, although he had to show that he had
the financial resources to cover his possible liability. This was held to
32
be unlawful by the Magistrate's Court, lawful by the Divisional Court
33
and finally, unlawful by the House of Lords. The vagueries of these
decisions discouraged prosecutions, demonstrating that the "conduct of
the gaming" could not be subject to efficient regulation.
The second qualification was a concession to the age old custom of
clubs charging for gaming. To accommodate this, the 1960 Act allowed
genuine social clubs to retain the custom of charging "card money.""
Subsequently there was a proliferation of "bingo clubs" which possessed those club characteristics required by the act. The result was a
substantial bingo industry and the growth of petty gambling; something the 1960 Act had in fact sought to prevent.
29. Betting and Gaming Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 60, § 16(1)(a)(ii); Betting Gaming and Lotteries Act, 1963, 11 & 12 Eliz. 2, ch. 2, § 32(1)(a)(ii).
30. [1966] 2 All E.R. 639 (Q.B.).
31. Id. The means test was passed if any member of the assembled players could
show that he was able to meet the financial commitments involved if the Bank should
lose while he was in possession of it.
32. [1967] 3 All E.R. 360 (Q.B.).
33. Crickett v. Kursaal Casino Ltd. (No. 2) [1968] 1 All E.R. 139 (H.L.). An appeal
from the Magistrates Court which is essentially a criminal court is to the Divisional
Court of the Queen's Bench Division. In usual circumstances, an appeal from the Divisional Court is to the Court of Appeal, but in instances where there are important matters of law the matter can "leap-frog" to the House of Lords.
34. Betting and Gaming Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 60, § 16(7).
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Present Legislation
The two qualifications of the 1960 Act enabled commercial interests to exploit gaming. The Gaming Act of 1968 attempted to remedy
the deficiencies of the 1960 and 1963 Acts, by discarding the "conditions of lawful gaming," and replacing them with a regulatory system."
Several administrative bodies were also created, and Sections 32
through 39 of the 1963 Act were repealed.
Under the 1968 Act, gaming is regulated in relation to the premises being used, with permissible types of gaming being determined by
these classifications. Premises will either fall within Part I or Part II of
the Act, and gaming is only unlawful if it is carried on in premises or
under conditions other than those laid out.
The distinction between premises falling within Part I and Part II
of the Act is the extent of control exercised over them, with licensing
and registration serving as the instruments of control. Licensing is required for those premises occupied by proprietary clubs while members
clubs are subject to registration. There is nothing to prevent a member's club from being granted a license if a member is prepared to assume the responsibilities attached to the license and the constitution
of the club permitted it. Generally, only established clubs such as
working mens' clubs, miners' welfare institutes, etc. are registered,
while all gaming clubs or casinos are in fact proprietary clubs.
Licensed premises are subject to greater control and a license is
granted only after a thorough investigation as to the fitness of the person or body of persons applying for it.3 6 It may be terminated or varied
at any time at the request of the controlling authority, if it's standards
fall short of those expected. 3 Although the regulation of registered
clubs may extend to the submission of the books of accounts or limits
on the amount of charges or stakes, generally there is less control.
The Control Machinery
The apparatus of control includes the use of established authorities such as the judiciary, the police and a central authority - the Gaming Board. The 1963 Act gives the Gaming Board considerable powers
(by advice and rights of appeal) to influence decisions of the local Licensing Authority created by the Act. The Gaming Board grants certificates of consent, which are conditions precedent to application for li35. The Gaming Act, 1968, ch. 65, § 53.
36. Id. at § 43 (the Gaming Board, with the assistance of the local police, conducts
the investigations).
37. Id. at sch. 2. (this section deals with the grant, renewal, cancellation and transfer
of licenses).
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censes, and is extremely concerned with fitness and propriety, as
evidenced by its paranoia about "organized crime." The Board works
alongside the Licensing Authority which has the power to grant, refuse
or modify a license, and in exercising its powers, the Licensing Authority must consider the advice of the Board, in addition to the prescribed
regulations." The Secretary of State also has power to modify such
regulations, but must consult with the Board before doing so. This system provides for the interaction of all controlling authorities and gives
the Board almost absolute powers of regulation. It has been stated that
the local licensing authority is the "king pin" of the licensing machinery. 3' Clearly, this is true, and in London the differing views and attitudes of the various licensing authorities is vitally important to prospective licencees. Although the Licensing Authority looks to the
Board to advise them on technical or specialist matters arising from
the nature of gaming, the Board itself can be a party to the hearing of
the license application and thus is careful not to urge any views upon
the licensing authorities (out of court) which might be prejudicial to
any particular application. The role of the courts is also relevant in
that they have the power to disqualify a licensee from holding a licence
and impose criminal sanctions such as fines and imprisonment.
ParticularProblems
1. The Granting of Credit
The intention of the 1968 Act was to prevent or restrain the practice of gambling on credit. Originally, the Gaming Houses Act of 18540
made it an offense for any person to "advance or furnish money" for
the purposes of gaming, 41 but since the repeal of that Act during the
1960 reforms there had been no restriction on lending.4 This situation
was remedied by Section 16 of the 1968 Act which prohibits licensed
clubs from allowing credit for gaming in any form whether by loan,
redeeming debts to other players, or allowing losses to stand on account. 43 Section 16 (1) provides that it is an offense for the licensee or
anyone acting on his behalf to make any loan or to allow any credit or
38. Id. at §51 (the Licensing Authority does not have to accept the recommendation
of the Board; the Board only has a power of veto in refusing to grant a certificate of
consent to an applicant for a grant of a license).
39. GAMING BOARD FOR GREAT BRITAIN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 30, para. 96. (London,
1969).
40. 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 38 (1854).
41. Id. at §18.
42. Betting and Gaming Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 60, §15.
43. This provision covers all clubs licensed under Part I of the Act.
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to release or discharge on another person's behalf the whole or any
part of any debt:
(a)
(b)

for enabling any person to take part in the gaming; or
in respect of any losses incurred by any person in the
gaming.

These prohibitions do not apply to checks, since Section 16 (4)
specifically provides that nothing in the Gaming Act of 1710, the Gaming Act of 1835, the Gaming Act of 1845 or the Gaming Act of 1892
shall affect the validity of, or the remedy for, such a check. This effectively removes "checks" from the general prohibition on the enforcement of securities." The importance of this cannot be overstated, as it
is the cornerstone of British law with respect to the enforceability of
gaming debts. Today, gaming in the United Kingdom has become a
billion dollar industry, due in part to this exception.
A recurrent problem in the area of credit involves the repeated
acceptance of checks from persons whose previous checks may have
been dishonored. Such transactions could be seen as a granting of unlawful credit since it could be inferred that the recipient of the check
knew that it would not be honored on a first presentation. This
amounts to a "sham"-a transaction which allows the licensee to extend the customer credit. In attempting to deal with this problem, the
British Casino Association has issued guidelines which state that a casino cannot accept a check from a player in exchange for tokens if that
player has dishonored a previous check from which the debt, or any
part of it remains outstanding. 5 However under certain circumstances,
the management of a casino may accept a check where, despite the
previously dishonored check, both the casino and the player genuinely
expect that the new check will be honored on presentation as required
by Section 16 of the 1968 Act. The management, for example, may accept the check if it is aware of an influx of funds into the customers
account. Of course the casino must prove that this expectation was jus44. Provided that the check is not post-dated and it is exchanged for cash for the full
amount of the check, or is exchanged for tokens at the same rate as would apply for cash
to the amount for which the check is drawn. Where the holder of a license under the Act
accepts a check in such circumstances he must, within two days, have the check delivered to a bank for payment or collection.
In Ladup Ltd. v. Siu (Q.B. Div. June 6, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library,
Cases file) it was found that checks signed by the defendant were incomplete because
they did not identify the banker and payee. As a result they could not be described as
checks and the plaintiff was unable to enforce payment on those particular documents
because they were not covered by Section 16(2) of the Act.

45. BRITISH CASINO ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR ACCEPTED
(1984). [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR ACCEPTED PRACTICE].

PRACTICE at

para 1,
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tified, as in the situation where the customer is a long standing member of the casino and it is familiar enough with the customer's affairs
to have a reasonable assurance of repayment. It may be inferred from
this example that if a player has an existing indebtedness to a casino
which he has yet to repay, the only situtation where a casino can reasonably expect the check to be met on presentation is if the value of
the check is considerably less than the outstanding indebtedness, otherwise there is no reason why the customer cannot pay off his indebtedness as a whole.
Where a casino chooses to accept a check in these circumstances a
procedure prescribed by the British Casino Association must be followed whereby the transaction must be approved and authorized by
the casino "at director level or, in rare circumstances, by a manager
holding the gaming board's grey license.""' In addition, a record of the
authorization must be kept showing:
(a)
(b)
(c)

Reasons for the approval;
Name and title of person who authorized it and his/her
signature confirming the decision;
The outcome (e.g.) whether the check cleared."7

A "dishonored" check is defined as any check returned unpaid,
whether marked for re-presentation or not.48 Where the casino has limited the amount for which a customer may cash a check, no check facility which would cause the player's liability to exceed that limit may be
permitted by the casino except in the special circumstances outlined
above governing the acceptance of the player's check after a previous
dishonor. There is a prescribed procedure for increasing check cashing
the same as that for the acceptance of checks from
facilities,4 9 which is
90
defaulting players.
Settling Claims on Dishonored Checks

2.

Section 16 of the 1968 Act, notwithstanding what has previously
been said, is fraught with problems concerning the recovery of debts
arising from dishonored checks given in return for gaming tokens. Section 16(4) in relation to checks is vital but note that any release
outside Section 16(1)(a) and (b), remains unaffected by the prohibition
under the Act. The question remains: Is a debt arising from a dishon46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para 3.
Id. at para 6.
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ored check a Section 16(1) debt in respect of losses incurred in the
gaming? If this is the case, the Act prevents releases under agreements
whereby a lesser sum is accepted in discharge of a larger debt. Thus, it
would appear that a plaintiff can sue for the actual sum written on a
dishonored check, but cannot legally settle for anything less. Clearly,
this would create insurmountable difficulties for litigators where, for
example, other defenses raised by the payer of a dishonored check
render it necessary to settle for less that the full sum claimed.
Alternatively, it could be said that where a check has been accepted in return for tokens prior to gaming, the debt arises and remains so whether the player wins or loses when playing with the tokens. In this case, the debt cannot then be said to be "in respect of
losses incurred in gaming."
Section 16(3) prohibits the return of the check to a player before
presentation for redemption and payment of the amount for which it is
drawn, whether out of winnings or anything else. This also holds true
when a check is accepted in return for cash which may in turn be exchanged for tokens. The check is not "in respect of losses," but is in
respect of cash paid over to the player.
Common sense would dictate that as a matter of policy a licensee
should be able to settle a debt if:
1. There is a genuine dispute as to the legality of it, for example, whether or not a relevant contravention of the Act has
occurred;
2. Where it is plain that the full debt is not recoverable;
3. Where part of the debt will not be recoverable if a release
of part of the debt is not conceded, for example, where a
debtor has limited means or resides abroad.
These arguments were tested in the Court of Appeal in Regina v.
Knightsbridge Crown Court, ex parte Marcrest PropertiesLtd. and
were rejected. In that case, the appellants contended that where a sum
less than the face value of the dishonored check was accepted, it did
not amount to the release of part "of any debt in respect of any losses
incurred by any person in the gaming." It was also contended that
when a casino issues tokens against a check, the player did not incur a
debt at that moment. A customer might decide against gambling at
that time and leave the casino, or cash his tokens in. Alternatively, he
may win money on that day and cash in his tokens. It did not follow,
therefore, that when a check was dishonored a debt in respect of any
losses was incurred by the customer in the gaming. As Lord Justice
51.

[1983] 1 W.L.R. 300. (C.A. 1982).
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Ackner stated:
In our judgment when a cheque is given by the customer to
enable him to take part in the gaming, and is subsequently dishonored, then prima facie a debt has been incurred in respect
of losses in the gaming. Of course, if the customer can establish
that he never used the cash or tokens purchased by means of
his cheque, or that he in fact made no loss as a result of being
enabled through the acceptance by the casino of his cheque to
take part in gambling on their premises, then he would have
destroyed the prima facie case that the cheque which was dishonored had created a debt in respect of a loss incurred by him
'
on the occasion of their cashing his check."52
The only problem here is that if a casino is pressing a customer for
payment on one of his checks, it might not always have the cooperation
of the customer in establishing the chronology of events after the check
was exchanged for tokens. It was argued that if compromising a dishonored check was unlawful, casinos would sustain serious losses which
might otherwise have been mitigated. Although their Lordships were
sympathetic, their position was clear, writing: "[iut seems to us to be
fully consistent with the policy of the legislation, which is to ensure
that licensees do impose realistic limits on the credit which they accord
53
to their customers.

It could be argued that the narrower construction furthers statutory policy, by encouraging casinos to press for repayment. However, in
view of the Marcrest decision, it is now settled law that a check cannot
be compromised for a lesser sum than that claimed, and a settlement
for a lesser sum can only be accepted after judgment has been entered.
This raises difficulties because there are many situations in which a
customer would not wish to have a consent judgment entered against
him, when, for example, the judgment affects his credit worthiness.
There are also those cases where a casino may be discouraged from
pursuing a debtor to judgment if the transaction is in some way,
tainted.
The British Casino Association responded to court decisions on
this subject by issuing guidelines which state that "[nlo casino shall
agree to the compromise of the dishonored gaming cheque or enter into
any arrangement to make settlement for players debts arising from
such a cheque for less than the full amount in which that cheque was
52. Id. at 309.
53. Id. at 310.
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There may be some circumstances where the licensee is not the
plaintiff as, for example, where a receiver has been appointed over the
assets of a casino. If the casino license remains in existence, the receiver is bound by its limitations, but if the license is withdrawn, it is
arguable that the restrictions no longer apply and the receiver is in the
position of any other plaintiff and is not bound by Section 16(1).
There has been some recent relaxation of the stringency of Section
16 insofar as it relates to checks which have not been dishonored. The
Gaming (Amendment) Act of 1986 which came into effect on 1 August
1987 permitted "consolidation" of checks for the first time. The main
purpose of this act is to permit redemption of a check which has previously been accepted in exchange for cash or tokens if the check has not
been dishonored and provided that it is redeemed by the person for
whom it was accepted by giving cash or tokens or a substitute check
(or a combination) to an amount equal to the redeemed check or
checks."
Foreign Gaming and the Operation of the Gaming Acts
The Gaming Act of 1845 and the Gaming Act of 1892 do not
render a gaming contract which is lawful abroad, void and unenforceable in England. 6 Money lent abroad for the purposes of gaming
abroad, is recoverable in English courts, provided that the debt is recoverable both in English courts, and in the foreign jurisdiction. It
must be remembered, however, that any security given for a gaming
loan or won by gaming is not enforceable in England. This is because
by Section 1 of the Gaming Act of 1710 and the Gaming Act of 1835,
which state that such security is deemed to have been given for an
illegal consideration. A check is such security, and despite the fact that
the security may be enforceable in the foreign jurisdiction, it is not
enforceable in England and Wales. There is contrary opinion that such
a foreign gaming loan is not actionable because the check used as security is given in return for illegal consideration, therefore the loan itself cannot be enforced. It is submitted that this opinion is in error.
The matter was considered in Societe Anonyme des Grand Etablissements du Touquet Paris-Plagev. Baumgart5 7 which followed the existing precedents.
If a foreign gambling debt is enforceable in the foreign jurisdic54.

GUIDELINES FOR ACCEPTED PRACTICE supra

55.
56.
57.

Gaming (Amendment) Act, 1986 §2(a).
Saxby v. Fulton, [19091 2 K.B. 208.
(1927] 1 All E.R. 280.

note 43 at para. 1.
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tion, it will also be enforceable in England. The operation of the 1845
and 1892 acts apply only to gaming which is unlawful in England."
Loans for gaming overseas, are not void under English law, provided
the loan is lawful in the foreign jurisdiction. With respect to 'lawful'
foreign gaming debts, the relevant English law accommodates the operation of foreign law in that it takes note of how the foreign law treats
the gambling debt.
Jurisdiction in the English Court for Claims Outside the EEC
The English courts clearly have jurisdiction over gaming debts incurred in the United Kingdom. With regard to foreign gaming debts,
English courts will have the necessary jurisdiction if:
1. The debtor is present in the United Kingdom and has been
served with legal process there. The debtor only has to be
"present" for a short period; or
2. The debtor is domiciled or ordinarily resident in the
United Kingdom. "Domiciled" means that the United
Kingdom is the debtor's permanent home, and "ordinarily
resident" means that the debtor has more than a "temporary presence" in the United Kingdom; or
3. A breach of contract has been committed by the debtor in
the jurisdiction of the English courts. The contract may
have been made overseas and out of the jurisdiction; or
4. The debtor submits to the jurisdiction of the English
courts, or the gambling transactions provides that the obligations under it are to be enforced by English courts.
The second and third basis for jurisdiction are probably the most
common grounds on which gaming debtors in England are pursued. If
the debtor is domiciled or ordinarily resident in England, he is likely to
have assets in the country, therefore it would be advantageous to proceed against him in the English courts. Often a gaming debtor has provided a 'marker' in the form of a check drawn on a bank in England. If
this check is not honored on presentation for payment in England,
then a breach of obligation occurs and this itself, gives the English
courts jurisdiction to hear claims against the debtor. Under the rule of
Saxby v. Fulton,5 9 although the check itself cannot be the basis of an
action, the loan for which it was given as security gives rise to a cause
of action.
Once the question of enforceability and jurisdiction have been re58.
59.

Co Ho To Ltd. v. Ward [1965] 2 Q.B. 623 [19631. 3 W.L.R. 1071.
[1909] 2 K.B. 208.
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solved, in essence, the collection of the overseas gambling debt follows
the normal course of litigation. The only material difference is that at
trial of the action, the relevant foreign law will be applied by the
courts.
ProceduralPoints for Service Outside the EEC
Service of process on an individual can either be by personal service or by postal service pursuant to Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 10 - Rule 1.60 If service is by post, then service is deemed to be
effective seven days after posting of the proceedings to the debtor.
If the debtor evades personal service or causes the posted service
to be returned by the post office dead letter service, steps can be taken
to effect substituted service on the debtor under Rules of Supreme
Court, Order 65 - Rule 4. On an application, the court will consider
alternative methods of service, including service by post to an address
where it is deemed that the writ will come to the knowledge of the
debtor, or by service on a person or body likely to be in contact with
the debtor, such as the debtor's lawyer, accountant or bank. In rare
circumstances the court may permit an advertisment to be placed in a
newspaper or journal. This method of service is used where the defendant's residence is not known, or in cases where there is reason to believe that he is keeping out of the way to evade service and it is not
possible to name any person who will be effective in reaching the defendant, upon whom service could therefore be effected in substitution.
In practice, such an order will only be made where there is good reason
to believe that the advertisment will be seen by the defendant.
Particular problems arise if a debtor is overseas or if service of
English proceedings is to be effected on him. To serve a debtor outside
the jurisdiction, leave of the court must be obtained under Rules of
Supreme Court, Order 11. The court will only grant leave if it can be
shown: that the creditor has a good arguable claim against the gambling debtor, that English courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
claim and that the English courts are the most convenient forum in
which the action should proceed. It is difficult to persuade the court to
grant leave to serve out of the jurisdiction if a debtor is not domiciled
60. This method of service is used when the defendant's residence is not known, and
in cases where there is reason to believe that he is keeping out of the way to evade
service, and it is not possible to name any person who will be effective in reaching the
defendant and upon whom service could therefore be effected in substitution. In practice, such an order will only be made where there is good reason to believe that the
advertisement will be seen by the defendant.
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or ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom."
Jurisdiction in the English Court for Claims Within the EEC
The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act, 198262 requires that a
defendant must be sued in the courts of the state in which he is domiciled,63 if that State has adhered to the Brussels Convention. 4 The
domicile of the defendant is interpreted as the genuine residence and is
slightly different from the interpretation generally attributed in English law. It is now no longer possible to serve a defendant domiciled in
one of the member states while on a short visit to another member
state.65 Special jurisdiction is conferred where a person domiciled in a
convention territory may be sued in matters relating to a contract in
the court of the place of performance of the obligation in question, that
is the payment of the debt. 6 A gaming debtor in the EEC may therefore be sued in the English courts if he is domiciled in England or if
the gaming debt was incurred there. On the issue of the writ the plaintiff simply has to endorse that the English court has jurisdiction.
Security for Costs
A plaintiff "ordinarily resident abroad" may be ordered by the
court to give security for the defendants' costs. Although the court's
power is discretionary, it is usually exercised in favor of the defendant.
If a plaintiff is a foreign gaming establishment, there is a strong possibility that the debtor will apply to the court for an order for security
for costs. However, if the plaintiff can show that he has substantial
property within the jurisdiction of a "fixed and permanent nature and
available for cost," or if the defendant himself is not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, no order for costs will be made.
The jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention do not
deal with the security for costs with respect to litigation within the
EEC, but the Convention is important since one of its objectives is to
facilitate the enforcement of procedural rights across the frontiers of
contracting states. A recent decision of the Chancery Division6" held
61. It must be remembered that the debtor is always entitled to challenge the jurisdiction of the English courts.
62. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act, 1982 11 Eliz. ch. 27.
63. Id. art 2, sched. 1.
64. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil
and Commercial Matters. 21 Q.J. EUR COMM. (No. L. 304) 50 (1978).
65. Id. art. 3, sched. 1.
66. Id. art. 5, sched. 1.
67. Porzelack KG v. Porzelack (UK) Ltd. [1987] 1 All E.R. 1074.
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that in exercising its discretion to order security for costs where the
plaintiff was ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction, the court would
take into account, as an important but not a decisive factor, the substantial and improved rights of enforcement available to a defendant
under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act. Relevant factors may
include, for example, whether the enforcement of an order for costs
would be diffcult in practice whether because of the nature of the
plaintiff's assets or other matters.
Preservationof the Defendant's Assets Within the Jurisdiction
Under Section 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981, the High
Court has the power to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining a
debtor from removing his assets from the jurisdiction of the court, or
otherwise dealing with his assets located within the jurisdiction,
whether or not the debtor is domiciled, resident or present within the
jurisdiction. Known as a Mareva6 8 injunction, this relief will be granted
where the plaintiff can show that he is likely to obtain a judgment
against the debtor for a certain or approximate sum. The plaintiff must
also show that he has reason to believe that the debtor has assets
within the jurisdiction to meet the judgment and that the debtor might
remove these assets from the jurisdiction or dispose of them within the
jurisdiction so that they are not available or traceable when a judgment is obtained.
The law in relation to the granting of injunctive relief for the protection of a litigant's rights pending the hearing of an action has been
transformed over the past ten years by the Anton Pillar 9 and Mareva
relief, two developments which have greatly expanded the law in this
area.
Procedure on Obtaining a Mareva Injunction
A Mareva injunction is sought where the plaintiff fears the consequences of not restraining a defendant's assets. This may be particularly necessary where the debtor does not reside in the jurisdiction.
68. Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A. [1975] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 509. (C.A.) (an injunction issuing under the High Court's power pursuant to
Supreme Court Act of 1981 § 37(3) is commonly referred to as a Mareva injunction).
69. This is a mandatory injunction allowing the plaintiff's solicitor to inspect documents of chattels on the defendant's premises, and to take photographs or copies of
them. It is used in cases where it is vital for a plaintiff to prevent a defendant destroying
or disposing evidence, thereby making it difficult for the plaintiff to prove his case. The
basis of the Anton Pillar order is in Rules of Supreme Court, Order 29-Rule 2(1). See A
v. C [1980] 2 All E.R. 347 (Q.B.).
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The application for a Mareva injunction is usually ex parte on affidavit
and in urgent cases can be before the issue of the writ or originating
summons as long as the order contains an undertaking to issue
forthwith.7"
Although most Mareva applications are in the Commercial
Court,7 1 the principles are the same wherever the order is granted. The
applicant must put the writ or a draft before the court, together with
an affidavit, in draft if absolutely unavoidable, setting out the claim,
the amount, and the point, if any, made against the defendant.
The affidavit in support must show that it is reasonable to believe
that there are assets of the defendant within the jurisdiction, and that
there is a risk that the defendant will remove his assets unless restrained. Full and frank disclosure of all material matters must be
made and therefore, the affidavit should contain as much information
as possible.7 2 Notice can be given to the defendant and third parties in
control of assets, by telephone if necessary, and the written order will
be sent afterwards. A penal notice warning of the consequences of a
breach of the injunction should also be included.
The plaintiff need not have a strong prima facie case, nor one
which will succeed under an application for summary judgment. The
test is whether he has a "good arguable claim." The court has broad
discretion in these cases, and while the plaintiff must present a good
arguable claim for the exercise of the Mareva jurisdiction, ultimately
the court must consider the evidence as a whole in deciding whether or
73
not to exercise the statutory jurisdictions.
The injunction applies to all assets tangible and intangible within
the jurisdiction. All assets are potentially within the scope of the injunction as long as they are within the jurisdiction and in the legal or
beneficial ownership of the defendant, and are not subject to legal or
equitable interests of third parties. The injunction is inapplicable assets outside of the jurisdiction.""
An injunction may be granted in the aid of executing a judgment,
(although it cannot be used to enforce a judgment) on the same basis
70. In re N (infants), [1967] 1 All E.R. 161 (Ch. D.).
71. The Commercial Court is part of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court
of Justice. Proceedings involving insurance, banking or other mercantile matters are suitable for the Commercial Court. See Administration of Justice Act, 1970 ch. 31, § 3.
72. See Negocios Del Mar S.A. v. Doric Shipping Corporation S.A. (The "Assios"),
[1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 331 (C.A. 1978).
73. Ninemia Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgellschaft m.b.H und Co.
K.G., [1984] 1 All E.R. 398 (C.A. 1983); but see, J.T. Stratford & Son Ltd. v. Lindly and
Another, [1984] 3 All E.R. 102 (H.L.).
74. Intraco v. Notis Shipping Corporation of Iberia, (The Bhoja Trader), 11981] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 256 (C.A.).
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as in an application before judgment, except that the existence of the
judgment itself serves as the basis of the claim."8 However, the risk
that the defendant will remove his assets must still be proven. This
power is exercisable despite the existence of other methods for enforcing execution, since it is up to the judgment creditor to select his remedies. It should also be noted that the injunction does not give the judgment creditor any right in the property, unlike other methods in the
execution process.
Mareva Injunctions in Relation to Bank Accounts
Generally, the assets of a foreign debtor will consist of bank accounts within the jurisdiction, and particular problems arise with respect to banks and Mareva injunctions. The plaintiff will usually be in
possession of a dishonored check and will therefore have some details
of the debtor's banking arrangements, yet compliance with an injunc76
tion by a bank is still time consuming and expensive. Thus, the order
as it relates to the bank should clearly identify what assets are covered
and to what extent.
The plaintiff should be able to identify the funds within the jurisdiction by naming the bank and if possible the branch where the funds
are deposited. If the branch is not known the bank could be requested
to "trawl" its branches. 7 7 Such an exercise would cost approximately
£2,000, and in some cases may even be higher.
An additional problem is the application of the Mareva injunction
to assets other than money held by the bank. It was suggested by Lord
Justice Kerr that shares, title deeds, or articles held in the safe custody
referred to in the
by the bank are either not covered unless specifically
78
order, or perhaps, should be expressly excluded.
The Contempt Rules in Relation to Third Parties
Generally, plaintiffs suing on dishonored checks will be seeking to
freeze bank accounts of various debtors. The leading case on this issue
75. Orwell Steel (Erection and Fabrication) Ltd. v. Asphalt and Tarmac (U.K.) Ltd.,
[1985] 3 All E.R. 747 (Q.B. 1984); Stewart Chartering Ltd. v. C & 0 Managements S.A.
and Others, [19801 1 All E.R. 718 (Q.B. 1979), (Mareva injunction was continued after
judgment).
76. Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [19821 1 All E.R. 556 (C.A. 1981); Seatrain v. U.K.
Ltd., [1981] 1 All E.R. 806 (Q.B.).
77. "Trawl" is a term used by banks and involves making inquiries of every branch as
to the existence of an account. See Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL at 586.
78. Id. at 590. This part of the decision is obiter dictum and does not have the burdening effect of precedent.
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Z Ltd. v.A-Z and AA-LL, 7 9 considered the contempt aspect of Mareva
injunctions as it affected banks and third parties. That case held that a
third party is liable if he knowingly assists in the breach of the injunction, or if he knows of the terms of the injunction, but nevertheless
wilfully assists in a breach by the person to whom it was addressed. It
is clear that a third party can be in contempt even if a defendant himself has not yet received notice of the injunction, because the third
party is interfering with the administration of justice.
The knowledge of the bank's employees is very important when
the injunction affects a financial institution. An employer is responsible for the employee if he knowingly assists in the breach of a court
order, but what if an employee unintentionally disobeys a court order
of which he has no knowledge, even though another employee has had
notice of it? This issue was resolved by Lord Justice Eveleigh when he
wrote: "I do not think that it should be possible to add together the
innocent state of mind of two or more servants of the corporation in
order to produce guilty knowledge on the part of the corporation.8
The applicant for a Mareva injunction must make certain, for the
bank's purposes, that the order is clear as to its scope and involvement.
The order usually refers to numbered accounts and it is better to be as
specific as possible in all respects, especially when the order indicates a
maximum sum, since the bank has freedom to allow withdrawals if the
assets exceed the figure in the order. The more information the judge
possesses, the more specific he can be, thus the plaintiff, if possible,
should designate the particular account which is the subject of the
order.
Courts will only find a bank in contempt in the clearest of cases,
and the greater the difficulty in discovering the account and consequently controlling it, the less likely the risk of contempt of court,8 ' for
as Lord Justice Eveleigh noted:
Carelessness or even recklessness on the part of the banks
ought not in my opinion to make them liable for contempt unless it can be shown that there was indifference to such a degree that it was contumacious. A Mareva injunction is granted
for the benefit of an individual litigant and it seems to me to
be undesireable that those who are not immediate parties
should be in danger of being held in contempt of court unless
they can be shown to have been contumacious. 2
79.
80.
81.
82.

[1982]
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1 All E.R. 556 (C.A. 1981).
581.
582.
583.

N.Y.L. SCH. J.

INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 8

Orders for Disclosure of the Debtor's Assets
The Mareva injunction may state a specific sum to be frozen, or it
may simply be a general order covering all the defendant's assets, in
which case, an application to discharge or vary may follow. Since the
plaintiff has to specify his damages, it has become a common drafting
practice to limit the order to a specific sum so as to minimize inconvenience to the defendant. The purpose here is to allow the defendant to
use the balance of his assets. The application of a maximum sum to
third parties who have no knowledge of what other assets are held by
the defendant can cause problems, because of the danger that any release of funds or assets in the belief that other assets are frozen will
probably be in violation of the order. The solution is for an order for
discovery to be made, to locate and identify all the defendant's assets
so that those above the claim can be released. It is submitted that the
maximun sum can include not only the amount claimed, but costs, together with interest and the likely damages and costs incurred for
third parties.
The courts have inherent jurisdiction to make an order in support
of a Mareva injunction, 3 for example, a defendant may be ordered to
disclose his assets on an affidavit. The rationale is that without such an
order, the injunction might be ineffective where a defendant has hidden his assets. In addition, a plaintiff may be deterred from seeking a
Mareva injunction if he does not know the value of the defendant's
assets since if his specifics as to damages is called upon, the order
freezes all assets in the absence of disclosure, over and above the sum
necessary. For example, if a defendant has £5,000,000 equally distributed in five bank accounts and has only been served with an injunction
up to the sum of £1,000,000, each bank will protect its position as to
the £1,000,000 whereas if an order for disclosure were made, the order
could be amended and served upon each bank, with the £4,000,000 balance available to the defendant.
Strategy - Mareva's and Summary Judgment (R.S.C. Order 14)
Under Rules of Supreme Court Order, 11, an application, may be
made for leave to serve a foreign defendant out of the jurisdiction.
This application should be made at the same time as the application
for a Mareva injunction since the injunction must be based on the
same cause of action within the jurisdiction. One affidavit will serve for
both the Mareva and the Order 11 leave, along with the appropriate
draft order. Where the injunction has been granted, the plaintiff can
83.

A and Another v. C and Others, (No. 2), [1981] 2 All E.R. 126 (Q.B.).
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serve an application for summary judgment under Rules of Supreme
Court, Order 14, once the statement or points of claim have been
served and a Notice of Intention to Defend the Action has been filed.
If there has been no Acknowledgment of Service or Notice of Intention
to Defend, the proper course is to proceed under Rules of Supreme
Court, Order 13 for a judgment in default. If the defendant begins to
defend the action, however, an Order 14 summons can be served. This
summons is either returnable at the same time as the hearing to discharge or vary the Mareva injunction, and conveniently allows the issues to be argued at this point. The majority of Mareva cases are often
disposed of at this time.
Leave to defend an Order 14 summons can be given either conditionally or unconditionally, so that payment has to be made or security
to proceed. This is often the
provided before the defense is allowed
4
case where the defense is shadowy.
In the Commercial Court, Marevas and summary judgment go
hand in hand. Straightforward debt collecting applications for summary judgment are best heard in the Queen's Bench Division. The
timely use of an application for summary judgment is an important
ancilliary tactic in pursuing a defendant already subject to a Mareva
injunction.
Ensuring the Cooperation of the Debtor - The Bayer Order
Service of process on foreign gaming debtors has proved immensely difficult and required inventive thinking and ingenious methods of service. In the course of duty, a process server posed as a call
girl in an effort to obtain entry to the premises of one known debtor.
On another occasion, where it proved impossible to locate a foreign
debtor's London address, a process server waited four hours outside a
well known London casino only eventually to be moved on by worried
security staff.
More recently developed methods are available to force the debtor
to be cooperative." A plaintiff may in certain circumstances obtain a
Bayer order, first granted in Bayer A.G. v. Winter et al.86 In that case,
the plaintiffs traded within the United Kingdom as Bayer (U.K.) Ltd.,
84. Rules of Supreme Court, Order 14, Rule 14; Paclantic Financing Co., Inc. and
Others v. Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 930 (C.A.); Rosengrens Ltd. v.
Safe Deposit Centres Ltd., [1984] 3 All E.R. 198 (C.A.); First City Development Corp.
Ltd., Continental Pacific Development Corp. and I. & B. Management Ltd. v. Stevenson
Construction Co. Ltd., [1983] 48 B.C.L.R. 242.
85. A debtor can, in the normal case, be ordered to file affidavit evidence as to his
assets while being restrained from disposing of his assets within the jurisdiction.
86. [1986] 1 All E.R. 733 (C.A.).
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and brought an action against the defendant for the sale of counterfeit
insecticides. The plaintiffs were concerned that the insecticide was ineffective for the purpose for which it was intended and consequently
the defendant's actions could cause great harm to their reputation and
business. The counterfeit activities appeared to be of an international
character and the plaintiffs feared it was only the tip of the iceberg.
The court in Bayer initially issued an order against the defendants
requiring them to disclose to the plaintiffs the precise whereabouts of
all correspondence, invoices and other papers relating to the transactions in which the counterfeit product had been supplied or offered.
This order also required the defendants to disclose the value and location of their assets within the jurisdiction. In addition, it was further
ordered that each defendant, after service of the order, make out a true
affidavit setting forth such particulars.
Except for the usual rules as to contempt, it has been difficult to
give effect to such an order if a defendant simply choses to ignore it.
The plaintiff had even fewer options if the defendant ordinarily resided out of the jurisdiction. Attempting to give effect to the court's
order, the plaintiffs in Bayer sought an ex parte order, requiring the
first defendant in particular to deliver up his passport to the person
who shall serve the order upon him. The plaintiffs' attorneys would
return it to him on the expiration date referred to in the order.
Judge Walton of the Chancery Division denied such relief ex parte
and left the plaintiffs to apply to the Court of Appeal. The plaintiffs
contended that without the protection of an order requiring the defendant deliver up his passport, they would be denied the information
which the order of Judge Walton was intended to secure to them. The
plaintiffs also stated that the Court had jurisdiction to grant such an
order under Section 37 (1) of the Supreme Court Act of 1981, which
provides that the "High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or
final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it
appears to the court to be just and convenient so to do." In granting
the relief sought, Lord Justice Fox wrote:
The court has to exercise that discretion according to established principles and the particular matter with which we are
concerned at the moment, namely of an injunctive restraint
upon a person leaving the jurisdiction, is not one on which
there appears to be a previous authority. . . . [I]t seems to me
that the courts should not shrink, if it is of the opinion that an
injunction is necessary for the proper protection of party to the
action, from granting relief, notwithstanding it may, in its
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terms, be of a novel character.8 7
Consequently, it appears that a defendant may be ordered to deliver up his passport if it will assist the plaintiff in obtaining effective
relief.
Writs of Ne Exeat Regno

It is almost impossible to obtain the above sought relief by seeking
a writ of ne exeat regno. This writ, which is a form of equitable bail,
can only be issued if the following requirements of Section 6 of the
Debtors' Act of 1869 are satisfied:
(i) The action is one in which the defendant could have
been arrested at law, prior to the enactment of the Debtors' Act of 1869;
(ii) a good cause of action for at least £50 is established;
(iii) there is a 'probable cause' for believing that the defendant is about to leave England unless he is arrested; and
(iv) the absence of the defendant from England will materially prejudice the defendant in the prosecution of the
action."
The application for a writ of ne exeat regno can be made at any
time before final judgment, and is granted to ensure the attendance of
the defendant for cross-examination on his affidavit on the hearing of a
motion before the court. However, the courts have declined to extend
the writ beyond the date specified upon the defendant agreeing to deposit his passport.8 9
Such writs are enforced by the Court Tipstaff, ° and there is some
question as to their enforceability and relevance in modern litigation.
The difficulty with a writ ne exeat regno is that since the writ is only
effective in the jurisdiction of England and Wales, a defendant may
leave the country via Scotland. A Bayer order on the other hand appears to be much more effective and simpler while achieving the same
objective, since the surrender of a passport is an extremely effective
way of ensuring that a defendant does not leave the jurisdiction.
87.

88.
89.
Rules
90.

Id. at 737.
See Felton and Another v. Callis, [1968] 3 All E.R. 673 (Q.B.).
Chalvey v. Baldwin (February 18, 1983, Chancery Division, unreported), See also
of Supreme Court, Order 45, Rule 1(37).
The Court Tipstaff is an officer appointed by the marshall of the court.
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Enforcement out of Jurisdictionof Judgements Obtained in Britain
When gaming debtors reside out of the jurisdiction and do not
have assets within it, enforcement of the judgment will have to take
place in the debtor's country of origin. This requires a determination
as to whether an agreement for the reciprocal enforcement of judgment
debts exits with that particular country.
In 1968, the European Economic Community reached a convention
on jurisdiction and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments.'
The convention came into force in 1973 and in 1978 an Accession Convention was signed to cover the new membership of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland.
The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of 198292 changed English law to correspond with the Convention. In particular, where the
standard provisions of the 1968 Act are fully in force, a plaintiff suing
for example, in France, can apply to the English courts to freeze the
defendant's assets in England providing that the Brussels Convention
applies to the original claim.9 3 Once a foreign judgment has been given
in France, a plaintiff can enforce a judgment debt against the defendant's assets in the United Kingdom under the recognition and enforcement procedures of the Convention. There is complete agreement between the member states of the European Community on the principle
that a party's assets may be frozen in one way or another pending the
outcome of a trial.
Conclusion
The service of proceedings on debtors and in particular those
debtors who reside out of the jurisdiction does create some difficulties,
however, once service is effected, an application for summary judgment
under Order 14 or a default judgment under Order 13 is, more often
than not, obtained without difficulty. The real difficulties lie in the enforecment of the judgment, and there is no doubt that developments in
the law over the past ten years have facilitated the protection of the
plaintiff in situations where the defendant may ferret away his assets.
It is now possible to ensure that the defendant, and his assets, remain
firmly within the jurisdiction thereby making it worthwhile for any
plaintiff to proceed to judgment, if necessary. It should be noted that a
court will grant a Bayer order keeping the defendant personally within
91. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters 21 QJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 304) 50 (1978).
92. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, 11 Eliz. ch. 27.
93. See C.H.W. v. G.J.H. (reference for a preliminary ruling for the Hoge Raad der
Nederlander) [1982] E.C.R. 1189.
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the jurisdiction, only in very clear circumstances in which the defendant is likely to avoid compliance with an order.
The construction of Section 16 of the Gaming Act of 1968 as discussed in this article, makes it clear that casinos will have difficulties in
obtaining repayment unless they can proceed quickly and effectively to
either a summary judgment or obtain judgment in default."' Although
this appears to unnecessarily hamper the efficient collection of gaming
debts, it must be balanced against the clear purpose of Section 16,
which is to protect the players against themselves so "[t]hey are not to
be given by the casinos so much rope that they may eventually hang
themselves, figuratively or otherwise.""

94. Previous attempts, as in the 1960 and 1963 Acts to allow flexibility have facilitated the development of "loopholes" in the legislation and it is clearly the intention of
the legislature and the Courts to impose a firm and narrow interpretation on the 1968
Act.
95. Regina v Knightsbridge Crown Court, ex parte Marcrest Properties Ltd., [19831 1
W.L.R. 300, 302 (C.A.).

